fly in soupOn its way to a date with a public security listing, Blue Buffalo ran into a small problem.  It seems there was a fly in their soup; one which they claim to have been blissfully unaware.  Equally embarrassing was the fact their fiercest rival, Nestle Purina, had been the source of the discovery.  What followed the initial accusation is either evidence of the power the independent premium pet food company wields or the first act in a Greek tragedy. The outcome is likely to have an impact on the pet food industry investment and the pet food M&A landscape.

In March 2014, it was leaked that Blue Buffalo, the $600+ million revenue independent premium pet food marketer, had selected a trio of lead arrangers for its public offering. The company had, for years, been rumored to be on and off the market seeking a buyer at prices between $2 – $3 billion depending on the timing of the speculation. It appeared that the company was now ready to tap the public markets for liquidity, an event that filled the industry with equal parts fear and excitement.

Two months after the leak, Nestle Purina filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging its competitor was lying about the contents of its products. Nestle claimed that independent tests show that Blue Buffalo uses chicken byproducts and corn in some of its food formulations — despite making marketing claims to the contrary.  Nestle would later amend its case to dispute other product claims on kibble, treats, and even cat litter. The fact that the industries top dog would undertake efforts to undermine Blue Buffalo came as a surprise to many.  Many speculated it was a tactic to lower the potential acquisition price for the brand.  Blue Buffalo returned the volley several days later counter-suing Purina for defamation, a summary of which can be seen here.

In a letter to customers, Blue Buffalo Founder and Chairman, Bill Bishop wrote:

“It is an easy thing to make unsubstantiated claims, put them in a lawsuit and then publish them all over the Web to disparage and defame a company. It is quite another thing to prove those allegations… We will prove these and other matters in court with good reliable evidence, and we look forward to disproving the voodoo science that Nestlé Purina relied on to support their outrageous allegations.”

The complete responses from Bishop can be seen here and here. Later, Bishop would go all in on a letter to the editor of Businessweek that can be seen here.  During the process, the National Advertisers Review Board (NARB) recommended that Blue Buffalo modify marketing claims it was making about competing products.  While Blue Buffalo disagreed with the the conclusions of the NARB, they agreed to take into account their recommendations in the future.  Details of the review hearing, recommendation, and associated reaction can be seen here.

Upon reading the first letter of response, I knew Nestle had something.  History has shown that the de facto strategy for the guilty is to attack not the claim but the science of the test and the party administering it. If professional sports is a relevant proxy, sometimes that plan works.  So Blue Buffalo then set out to undermine the validity of the Purina’s independent test going so far as to claim the laboratory involved had “dubious scientific credentials.”  The company’s critique of Windsor Labs and its scientific findings can be seen here.

As it appeared the two sides were heading to court, Blue Buffalo issued a statement that one of its suppliers had mislabeled ingredients sent to their customers, which could (that choice of words is important) have resulted in Blue Buffalo product being made with poultry by-product meal.  That statement can be seen here.  While it is notable that Blue Buffalo is acknowledging some of Nestle’s claims, it is passing the buck to its supplier.  While Wilber-Ellis has a history of recall related issues, the names of other pet food companies who may have received mislabeled ingredients, as Blue Buffalo claims, have not surfaced.  Since the FDA and Wilber are choosing to remain silent on this issue (the FDA views those names, if any, to be confidential information), it would be natural to speculate that there are no other names and in fact, this circumstance was known to Blue Buffalo.  However, that is merely speculative. What is also interesting is that Blue Buffalo has not issued a voluntary recall (the FDA does not mandate a recall in cases where the ingredients involved do not have a reasonable probability of causing serious adverse health consequences), has not disclosed probable lot numbers, or offered to refund customers their money.  So far the strategy seems to be working as they have not wavered from their approach.

What happens next is likely to impact pet food investing and M&A.  If the circumstance above results in Blue Buffalo modifying or pulling its IPO plans, or going public and experiencing diminished value, or selling at a diminished value, it will be yet another cautionary tale of how supply chain issues can quickly erase equity returns hard earned over time in the pet space.  This may lead to investors pursuing pet consumables investments with greater caution and scrutiny.  Further, pet consumables M&A may come with more strings attached — broader seller representations and warranties, higher indemnification caps, etc. — or at lower valuations to account for this risk.  Companies that can demonstrate control over the product they put in the bag should also be ascribed a premium.  Owning your production assets becomes, in fact, more valuable. That written, if Blue Buffalo is able to hold shelf space, avoid a recall, and move forward with its liquidity plans, it will, in fact, validate how powerful the leading independent brand really is.

My view is the marketer is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the product in the bag matches the associated claims.  However, absent consumer lash-back, Blue Buffalo is unlikely to suffer much.  Further, given how much traffic their products drive at retail, pet specialty chains are more likely to accept the “it’s not our fault” explanation.  In the meantime, Blue Buffalo may get to see the results of the Freshpet IPO before confirming its path.  Freshpet is expected to price on November 6th.  At the mid-point of the range, Freshpet would command a fully diluted value of $414 million.  Based on estimated 2014 revenue, that would value the company at 3.5x – 4.0x revenue.  Those multiples would only serve to validate Blue Buffalo purported $3 billion price tag.

/bryan

Note: This blog is for informational purposes only. The opinions expressed reflect my view as of the publishing date, which are subject to change.  While this post utilizes data sources I consider reliable, I cannot guarantee the accuracy of any third party cited herein.

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CPO2In prior posts we have explored the notion that pet industry transaction volume is accelerating, and by all available measures in fact it is.  We have also delved into rumors of a public offering by Blue Buffalo later this year, noting the lack of public traded pure play pet companies. On Tuesday, Trupanion, a venture backed provider of health insurance for dogs and cats, announced it intended to file for an IPO on the New York Stock Exchange. We are also aware of at least one other company in the process of filing, and the concept of going public has been increasingly discussed in my industry coverage meetings.  This begs the question, are the public markets the most viable exit opportunity for a variety of midsized pet companies?

What is most notable about the Trupanion filing is the size of the company.  The business, of which I am a customer, disclosed that it was covering 181,634 pets as of March 31, 2014 and generated revenue of $83.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2013. On a quarterly basis, the company said it has posted quarter-over-quarter revenue growth since the first quarter of 2010. In the most recent quarter, ended March 31, the company reported revenue of $25.6 million, a 44% increase from the same period a year earlier.  However, also in the disclosure was the insight that the company lost $8.2 million in 2013 and has never made money.  That said, Trupanion has a huge intangible data asset, having covered a large population of pets for nearly 14 years; data that would be highly valuable to a variety of players in the pet supply chain. That notwithstanding, it is hard to believe that Trupanion, even at the most generous valuations, is going to achieve an offering price that results in a market capitalization that will motivate meaningful analyst coverage, given its size and earnings profile. Trupanion’s primary competitor, the larger Veterinary Pet Insurance Company, remains private. Other pet insurance companies have not met with favorable results in the public markets due, primarily in my estimation, size.

Often public filings are practical way of putting a “For Sale” sign on a business. Whether or not this is Trupanion’s intention, the mere optionality of a public listing would act as another catalyst for industry transaction volume.  Further, if successful it could pave the way for other midsized pet companies to explore the go public alternative.  Certainly companies such as Radio Systems Corp, Hartz Mountain (which is owned by publicly traded Uni-Charm Corporation) and United Pet Products (owned by publicly traded Spectrum Brands) would be well situated to tap the public markets for liquidity or acquisition capital. Further, brands such as Champion Pet Food, Dosckocil Manufacturing, Freshpet, Kong Company, Nature’s Variety and Merrick Pet Care would gain another exit alternative.

The analysis above separates the issues of “could” from “should”. While Trupanion has a clear path to a diversified growth plan through its data asset, the ability to sustain public company momentum for many of the companies listed above is limited. We have already questioned whether the much bigger Blue Buffalo can remain channel tied as a public company and it dwarfs most of the above listed companies in size and brand awareness.  However, more public pet companies would be good for the industry, which generally lacks a broad set of consolidators.

/bryan

 

 

 

 

accross the pongI often talk about PetSmart and VCA Antech being proxies for the direction and health of the domestic pet market because of the transparency it provides us into consumer pet product and healthcare spend through quarterly earnings reports and third party equity research.  However, the U.S. market should not be viewed as a proxy for the global pet industry.  Absent the transparency we enjoy through publicly traded U.S. pet companies our view of global pet markets is tied to a reliance on third party data firms (Euromonitor, Mintel, etc.). While these firms produce excellent research, there is an inherent latency to their content, making it hard to measure real time performance.  A partial solution to that problem looks to be coming in the form of a public listing for the UKs largest pet retailer, Pets At Home, Ltd. (“PAH”).

Earlier this week PAH filed for an initial public offering on the London Stock Exchange.  The company plans to raise £275 million, giving PAH a valuation of around £1.5 billion. Thew company operates 369 retail stores, 246 small animal veterinary centers and 116 in-store grooming salons across Britain.  Estimates puts the company’s share of its home pet retail market at around 12%. The British market is highly fragmented, with PAH’s five largest competitors totaling just 225 stores combined. The company should have ample opportunity to grow both its retail base and veterinary services concept given these market dynamics. PAH plans to open an additional 131 stores, 400 veterinary clinics, and 200 grooming salons.  The company would be the only listed pet retailer in Europe.

PAH was acquired by a private equity consortium led by U.S. based Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co (“KKR”), which also owns Big Heart Brands, the Del Monte Foods pet products division, in January 2010 for £960 million.  At the time, the company had trailing twelve month revenues of £402 million and EBITDA of £70 million, resulting in an implied valuation of 2.4x Revenue and 13.6x EBITDA.  Bridgeport Equity, the seller, had acquired the business for £230 million in July 2004. Assuming a £1.5 billion enterprise value for PAH, it would imply that the value of the business has increased over 55% since being taken over by KKR and friends.

According to the recently announced listing, PAH had sales of £598 million for its year ending on March 28, 2013. The company said its revenue increased 11.7% for 40-week period ending on January 2, 2104.  Extrapolating this growth for the full year yields revenue of approximately £700 million, resulting in an implied valuation at listing of 2.14x Revenue. At the time of its listing PAH expects EBITDA of £110 million, resulting in an implied valuation of 13.6x EBITDA.  This would value PAH at multiples nearly two times those prevailing for U.S. leader PetSmart (1.0x Revenue and 7.3x EBITDA) despite the two companies having similar same-store-sales for the prior 12 month period.  While PAH has produced better topline growth over the past year versus PetSmart and enjoys a better profit margin profile due to its services revenue, this still amounts to a very healthy premium even after you account for the 17% decline in PetSmart’s stock since October 2013.

Whether PAH is overvalued or correctly valued is likely a debate with no end, the truth likely lies somewhere in the middle.  Either way, KKR has made a handsome return in a short period, even after you consider the company has reinvested over £100 million in growth initiatives.  However, the real value for those that follow the industry, will be increased data and transparency.  While PAH’s market capitalization will be approximately 37% of PetSmart’s, it should receive solid coverage from equity analysts with strong UK sales and trading networks.  That coverage will help us better pinpoint how the British pet market is performing, and ultimately enable us to draw parallels between a key foreign market and our own as well as the leading retailers in both geographies.

/bryan

arrowAs most of you are well aware, the pet industry is in fact quite large.  Depending on how you measure industry size, the pet industry is the fourth largest consumer segment of the U.S. economy (excluding health care).  And where there are large market opportunities, logically, they are capital inflows from investors, both public and private, seeking to create wealth from changing dynamics in those markets.   As an example, if you were an investor in PetSmart’s public shares over the past five years, you have enjoyed a handsome return from the specialty retail chains’ ascendency, as consumers spent more on their pets as part of the broader humanization trend.

Pet companies have also received a considerable amount of interest from private equity funds seeking to capitalize on the growth trends inherent in the industry.  While I do not have purview into every equity funds predilections, I have yet to come across a consumer oriented growth equity or buyout fund that does not have an interest in the pet space.  Many of them long to replicate the success of Eagle Pack Pet Food, Old Mother Hubbard and Banfield Pet Hospitals.  This “professionalization” of the industry has been a thematic I have waxed on about at length in my prior reports.

However, despite the size of the opportunity and the amount of available capital seeking that very opportunity, private equity transaction volume in the pet industry has in fact been quite limited.  To put this in perspective, according to the Pitchbook platform, there were 364 private equity transactions completed in 2012 that involved consumer facing companies.  Of that deal volume, the pet industry made up just over five percent of private equity deal volume with 19 reported transactions.  The is a decline from the past three years, where pet industry transaction volume made up just over seven percent of total consumer transaction volume.  The chart below tracks the trend over time (source: Pitchbook).

GraphThrough April 2013, there have been six reported private equity investments in the pet industry, putting the industry trend at risk for a second consecutive deceleration.  So what gives?  A few thoughts based on my experience.  First, the interest of private equity in the industry does not align well with the size of its participants.  As a general rule, private equity firms target companies with at least $5 million in Operating Income, with a strong preference for more.  That is not to say that growth equity and buyout deals don’t get done involving pet businesses of every size, but the core interest from these investors is in companies with a strong track record of profitability.  The pet industry has a limited number of companies that fit this mold, with most businesses being bigger or well below that threshold.  Second, there is an active consolidator market in the industry which is a headwind for private equity firms to get a deal done.  If a seller can get a better valuation from a strategic, they will often bypass the private equity market all together and wait to do a strategic sale. Finally, the interest of private equity in the space tends to be disproportionately oriented around pet food and veterinary clinics. A lack of opportunities in these segments has increased focus on retailers, distributors and, more recently treat companies, but a historical sector bias has certainly limited deal volume.

I remain long term bullish on private equity and the pet industry, but, as evidenced by the above, the relationship between the two has some inherent complexity.  However, as private equity gets a track record of success in a broader segment of industry sectors look for the industry to embrace outside equity more fully.  Deals beget deals.

/bryan

dogThe pet industry continues to chug along.  Based on the information available, the industry posted strong growth in 2012 and is demonstrating all the critical signs of continued health — rising ownership levels, increasing innovation, expanding consumer spend, earnings growth from publicly traded participants, and active capital markets, both private placements and M&A.  In a year that was challenging due to economic uncertainty and political gridlock, the pet market did not miss a beat.

That said, we are only cautiously optimistic about 2013 on a relative basis. While we expect the industry to deliver a solid year when compared to other consumer segments, the pet market may have a difficult time out doing itself in 2013 for three reasons. First, the super premium food rotation that continues to compel growth in consumables is slowing, just not at the pace previously predicted.  At some point it will wane as a driver; 2013 may not be that year but the rally is clearly in the later innings, having only been extended by consumers concerns about quality and an increasing ability to finance said premium food purchases through rising disposable incomes. Second, the industry delivered incredible results in 2012, and comping against those results would be a challenge for an industry.  Notably, public traded pure-play pet companies grew earnings by over 21% in 2012, compared to 9.3% for the S&P500.  As a result, public traded equity prices of these pet companies outperformed the broader market by 25%. Finally, the industry is in a transitional period. Core pet owner demographics are changing, with Baby Boomer influence waning and GenX/GenY/Hispanic influence on the ascendency. Wellness as a central growth theme has benefited product sales, but veterinary volume growth remains poor. Until the product and services side are in sync, it will have difficulty achieving full impact. And channel shift from premises to online is taking place, albeit at a slow pace.

The industry also has meaningful upside to 2013 projected growth of 4.3%. That upside comes from five (apparently not everything comes in three) factors. First, consumers are in an upgrade cycle, having spent 1.9% more per pet product unit in 2012 and 2011.  If consumers continue to upgrade, or the impetus to upgrade expands to a broader segment of pet owners, revenues will increase faster than anticipated. Second, convenience is on the rise. Products and services are becoming increasingly available and operating frameworks are evolving to enable manufacturers broader reach. If access accelerates at a faster pace, revenues growth will benefit. Third, non-health service offerings continue to improve in both concept and delivery.  If disposable income continues to rise, or rises faster than anticipated, for core pet consumers, service revenues will benefit due to their discretionary nature. Fourth, the potential for the wellness theme to converge across product and service is improving through the continuing investment in information services. Information has the ability to ease the tension between owner and health provider. If platform adoption/usage accelerates faster than anticipated that will be good for veterinary clinic utilization.  Finally, capital continues to target the industry for above market returns.  Professionalization of the industry is good for growth.  If private placement volume accelerates industry performance will benefit.

As always, a full copy of my industry report is available by email.

/b

k2The rise of PetSmart has been well chronicled on my blog and in my bi-annual pet industry report.  A well established track record of margin expansion, earnings beats and EPS growth has made the company a darling within the pet industry, the specialty retail community, and one of the most widely praised stocks of the post recession era (full disclosure: I do not own the stock, nor am I providing any stock advice herein).  Since November 2008, the stock has increased over 400% (versus 68% for the S&P 500).  PetSmart’s return on invested capital (ROIC) for this same period placed them in the 96th percentile of all publicly traded equities.  For every dollar management invested, it made over $0.30/annually during this period.

Those that follow the stock, as equity analysts, industry observers, and retail investors, have become conditioned to expect an endless stream of  good news and gawk at the stocks progression up-and-to-the-right.  When there were bumps in the road (e.g., 4Q2011) we found external factors to blame (i.e., commodity prices, weather, Europe, etc.).  That notwithstanding, PetSmart management seemed to have the Midas touch. So it came as a shock to many when Nomura Securities analyst Aram Rubinson downgraded PetSmart’s equity early last week, cutting his target price from $72/share to $55/share.  Rubinson had been sitting on a “neutral” rating, but now he was ready to tell his clients to reduce their holdings.   Prior to joining Nomura from hedge fund High Road Capital, Rubinson was a senior research analyst at Banc of America Securities, where he was the #1 ranked Hardlines Retailing analyst, according to Institutional Investor.

Rubinson’s downgrade sent PetSmart’s equity price tumbling 8.9%, 12% off its 52-week high.  The crux of Rubinson’s recommendation was as follows — Amazon.  His thesis was, largely, that Amazon would take share and put pressure on the company’s margin as PetSmart becomes forced to subsidize shipping in order to compete in a category that is migrating online.  This a bell I first rung, politely in 2008, with more fervor in 2011 and I practically pounded the table in November 2012.  My point is that while Aram has a large platform for broadcasting his opinion on PetSmart’s market opportunity, this was not new news.

Notably, Deutsche Bank raised their target price on PetSmart’s stock to $71 on November 15th after the company delivered another strong quarter. As part of their commentary they made is clear that margin and multiple compression was not of concern because.  Shortly thereafter, Barclays Capital upgraded the stock from equal weight to over weight.  Nine analysts have rated the stock with a buy rating, two have given an overweight rating, fourteen have issued a hold rating, and one has given a sell rating to the stock. PetSmart currently has an average rating of overweight and an average target price of $74.00.

Given that the Amazon issue has been on the table now for some time, why did the stock really take a turn south?

First, the stock was ripe for profit taking.  Again, the business has been on tear and the stock has followed.  At it’s peak, PetSmart traded at 19.0x foward year EPS and 9.0x forward year EBITDA, both significant premiums to the market (44% on a price-earnings basis).  This is the first substantive pullback since July 2010, but the drivers at that time were macro — Greece, double dip, etc.  PetSmart would report a strong quarter and raise full year estimates in August 2010.   So when the company announced a reshuffling of the management deck chairs (see below), traders used Rubinson’s downgrade as a reason to take profits that they could hide behind.

Second, the forthcoming management transition was poorly communicated and contains risk.   As part of a what we learned was a “planned management succession”, CEO Bob Moran is becoming Chairman while COO David Lenhardt gets the CEO job.  Further, Joseph O’Leary, Executive Vice President of Merchandising, Marketing, Supply Chain and Strategic Planning (that’s a long title), gets the nod as President and COO.  This comes on the back of CFO Chip Molloy’s previously announced departure in November 2012; he retires in March 2013.   Net net, this larger wave of changes caught the analyst community by surprise.  Moran had made no mention of near term retirement (he is 62 years old), and while this is largely an in-house promo parade, that program has not always been met with positive ends — see Coca-Cola Company circa 1997, Goizueta, Ivester, and Daft, which launched the iconic beverage company into a lost decade of stock appreciation.  Further, anytime a public company CFO departs it gives investors pause.  Molloy is only 50 years old.

Finally, Amazon, but not Rubinson’s Amazon.  Yes, Amazon is taking share in pets, faster than anyone would have anticipated but the fate of PetSmart does not hinge on being competitive in the delivery price of pet food.  The market has shown very little interest in pet food home delivery no matter what the perceived convenience or savings.  Tens of millions of dollars have been buried waiting for this market to arrive. Rather, the threat of Amazon and its online brethren to PetSmart is two fold.  First, online players are developing capabilities that will enable them to serve as a one-stop-shop for pets — food, consumables, products, medications (Rx and OTC).   On a value and convenience basis this will attract a tangible set of customers, especially as the e-commerce generation (those born after 1970) amasses further purchasing power.  Second, PetSmart has structural issues as it relates to its online efforts.  The company currently outsources its online efforts to GSI Commerce, an eBay corporation.  While this is fine for a general catalog online, to compete against Amazon, wag.com, Pet360 and others you need in house controls and capabilities.  PetSmart’s contract has years to run and it would take tens of millions of dollars to put in place the infrastructure necessary to control its own destiny online.  This makes the investment banker in me believe PetSmart will make a catch-up acquisition within the next two years.  Until then, management will continue to downplay the competitive threat while working tirelessly behind the scenes to limit the damage.

PetSmart remains a great company with a robust outlook.  However, there are cracks in the facade; cracks that it did not take an equity analyst to reval.  The company has tangible problems, but it has overcome challenges time and again.  While the recent equity price correction seems justified, it’s too early to say the company has peaked.

/bryan

skullOne of the challenges in forecasting is failing to recognize the inherent frictions in the market.  For over two years I have been predicting a major IPO for the pet industry against the backdrop of expanding public company market multiples.  My initial thesis was that PetSmart’s market valuation heuristics would compel Petco to consider a listing.  Two dividend recaps later, the private equity owners of Petco seem happy to milk their cash cow with no public offering in site.  Natura? Sold.  Sergeant’s Pet Care? Sold, and probably too small anyway.  Pets at Home? Sold. Radio Systems? Private bond offering. Hartz Mountain? Recapped. Blue Buffalo? Crickets.  During this same period, a number of pet related public companies have been taken private (Del Monte, you see a food company while I see a pet company, and International Absorbents, as examples). So net net the market had experienced entropy where I predicted order.

There is a saying that “100% of shots not taken result in goals not scored”.  While I had taken my shots, it resulted in the same outcome — a bagel.  However, next week I get a consolation prize when Pfizer spins off its Animal Health Division into a new corporation, Zoetis Inc., listed on the New York Stock Exchange.  Zoetis engages in the discovery, development, manufacture, and commercialization of animal health medicines and vaccines.  The company derives 65% of its revenue from the livestock market and 35% from the companion animal space.  The company’s name is derived from zoetic, meaning “pertaining to life”.

Zoetis is a big business by pet industry standards, having generated over $4 billion in revenue and over $1 billion in EBITDA for the twelve month period ended July 1, 2012.   Post spin, the company will be the largest standalone manufacturer of animal health products globally, with roughly a 19% market share.  Vaccines and medicines for animals represents a $22 billion market globally according to Pfizer, of which approximately 30% represents veterinary vaccines for companion animals.  The U.S. market for these products is expected to grow at annual rate of 5.8% over the next five years, slightly higher than the total domestic vaccine market whose growth, over the same period, is projected at 5.3% according to Transparency Market Research. Notably, Zoetis grew approximately 30% in 2010 (in part due to the acquisition of Wyeth, whose animal health division, Fort Dodge, generated over $1 billion in revenue at the time of the transaction), 18% in 2011 and 4% over the first half of 2012.  Pfizer estimates that the public company value of Zoetis could be as high as $12.5 billion, or approximately 12.0x estimated 2012 EBITDA.  After the spin off Pfizer will own 80% of Zoetis.

Yes, the Zoetis IPO is essentially an overdue backdoor validation of my thesis – it’s not a products or consumables company or a specialty retailer, it’s an animal health empire.  Further, Zoetis was nurtured inside the womb of one of the largest global phrmara companies and not built from the ground up.  That said, the cloud has a silver lining:

  •  Yes, someone had to go first.  Often times a sector IPO leads to others, assuming it gets a warm market reception.  Given that Zoetis is a cash cow, it should be welcomed with open arms by retail investors.
  • The pro-forma valuation of Zoetis is healthy.   The company is expected to trade at a significant premium to core human pharma names, consistent with my belief that the companion animal health care market has strong tail winds and a large opportunity set ahead.  Notably, the valuation does a lot to validate the price paid for Perrigo’s acquisition of Sergeant’s, which I estimated at 10.0x EBITDA.
  • The pet market is lacking for public companies that focus solely on the industry.  Having greater transparency into industry related valuations is good for capital recruitment and exit market dynamics.

In closing, it’s notable that Pfizer spent nearly two years considering alternatives for Zoetis.  So while I predict other pet IPOs, I don’t suggest holding your breath until the next one.

/bryan