consumer products and services


The evolutionary cycle that is currently gripping the pet industry is now on full display, impacting all segments and all market participant. The market is no longer benefiting from historical growth drivers as new influences overrun incumbent paradigm. Notably, pet food prices have experienced deflation throughout 2017, and this pattern is projected to continue.

The differentiation and uniqueness in the pet industry’s operational model is rapidly eroding.  The industry is beginning to parallel its human corollary, changing the nature of competition and anointing new winners.  Barriers to product availability have eroded and the consumer behavior patterns resident in the human food and healthcare markets are increasingly exhibiting themselves within the pet industry

The challenge for market participants is that the current phase of competition is not programmatic in nature. The strategies that parties have historically relied upon to compete are unlikely to serve as effective guideposts for future strategic decision-making.  Market participants should brace for higher levels of volatility

This fact pattern will present the best-positioned companies with an opportunity to create outsized value. Capital will flow into companies best-positioned to take advantage of new ownership paradigm and evolving channel preferences of pet owners at pre-money valuations that better resemble technology multiples. Acquisition multiples for market leaders will expand as companies will be “bought” more often than sold. Buyers are more likely to view assets differently, due to the tendency for strategies to diverge in periods of uncertainty, reducing potential competition for deals

However, increased risk associated with the current operational paradigm will also drive a flight to quality and elongate deal cycles due to increased scrutiny. When multiples are elevated, marginals deals are more likely to fail due to associated risk discounts.  We expect buyers to search for companies with meaningful barriers to replication – brand, intellectual property, access to alternative sales channels, or proprietary products.

Against this backdrop there were four theme that caught our attention in 2017 (click through to view content):

  1. Services are increasingly driving the growth of the pet industry.

Slide0

2. As anticipated, Blue Buffalo launched into FDM.

Slide1

3. Digital distribution is accelerating and changing the competitive landscape.

Slide2

4. Supply chain integrity/sourcing are becoming a meaningful form of differentiation.

Slide3

In short, we are living in interesting time.

For a full copy of the report contact me directly.

/bryan

Note: This blog is for informational purposes only. The opinions expressed reflect my view as of the publishing date, which are subject to change. While this post utilizes data sources I consider reliable, I cannot guarantee the accuracy of any third party cited herein.

 

Advertisements

aisleEarlier this week, Blue Buffalo released its 2Q2017 financial results.  While the numbers are always interesting, analysts were looking for further clarity on the company’s FDM launch and its anticipated impact on full year results, as well as insights as to where the brand is migrating and how it might offset dilution associated with a multi-channel strategy.  In short, the quarterly results were only the appetizer and the FDM launch narrative the main course. Reactions from the call seem to fall squarely into two camps — satisfied or bewildered.  The stock was up 6.6% on the day, which tells you which camp Wall Street fell into, but off its high during the trading session.  The stock had been up a double digit percentage during the session.

The quantitative metrics made for a mixed bag.  The company delivered in line EPS despite a – 2.5% topline miss.  Management attributed the miss to inventory delevering at major pet specialty accounts.  Organic sales growth was +2.8% (+3.3% in dry and +0.7% in WTO) driven by +1.8% mix gain and +0.9% inflation.  Sell through was ~ 7% representing sequential growth over 1Q2017.  Notably pet superstore sell through declined ~ 6% versus sell-in and was down ~ 11% year-over-year.  In contrast ecommerce growth was robust leading to a total sell through growth rate of ~ 30% in the channel. Gross Margin was also up +235 bps year-over-year, driven by supply chain efficiencies and lower input costs.  This appeared to be +125 bps over consensus.  The company affirmed full year guidance for both top and bottom line. The long short is Wall Street likes earnings and in combination with margin gains, it was enough to look past the sale miss.  The narrative appeared something akin to the following — “We will make it up in FDM!”

Management elaborated on its FDM launch, stating the four retailers it has partnered with represent between 8% – 9% of the pet food market on a dollar basis.  This expands Blue Buffalo’s addressable market by ~ 20%.  The company’s products will now be available in an additional 6,000 doors. Given that FDM over indexes on cat and wet/treats, management believes this unlocks some potential for growth in WTO.  Based on some early looks at the product set in Publix, it appears FDM will be selling 25 lb. bags of Life Protection Formula for a price consistent with a 30 lb. bag on Chewy.com. Blue Buffalo is targeting a high single digits/low double digits share in its FDM accounts.  Said differently, they are targeting 8% – 10% share within the retailers that account for 8% – 9% share of the pet food market.

The most notable aspect of the call, was the fact that Blue Buffalo did not speak to PetSmart or Petco before announcing the launch, which had been in the works for close to a year.  Thus, there was no way for them to weigh the competitive response from their major pet specialty retail partners. Management’s response to analyst queries was akin to, “we are hoping for the best.”  Whether it was coincidental or contributory, PetSmart CEO, Michael Massey, resigned today (see press release here).  My sense is that Blue Buffalo did not want to alert these retailers ahead of their pending category resets.  This would have likely led to greater near term shelf losses as the superstores increase shelf space for their premium private label offerings.  Blue has demonstrated they understand the timing game and are playing it to their advantage.

And the pace of change for the pet industry keeps accelerating…

/bryan

Note: This blog is for informational purposes only. The opinions expressed reflect my view as of the publishing date, which are subject to change. While this post utilizes data sources I consider reliable, I cannot guarantee the accuracy of any third party cited herein.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

blue dogOver the past year, we have covered, at length, the transitional phase that the pet industry now finds itself in.  We have encouraged market participants to question everything they have come to know as the “status quo” for the industry and assess the likelihood that it will continue to prevail over the next three, six, twelve months and beyond.  For those who have dismissed the potential for wholesale industry change, we have pointed to the current political environment as a proxy, where the historical standard for how business gets done has descended into a state of entropy.  While the pet industry’s state of change has not reached the point of chaos, many traditional barriers have in fact fallen and are not likely to be seen again.

And another one goes…

Yesterday, Blue Buffalo began informing customers that it has begun distributing a subset of the BLUE Life Protection Formula (LFP) to select mass and grocery retailers.  Product will begin showing up on the shelves of Target, Kroger, Meijer, and Publix in August.  The company stated, “We have decided that broadening the distribution of LFP, our entry-level natural pet food line, is the natural evolution of our go-to-market strategy.”  The company intends to focus on smaller bag sizes and more mainstream formulations in its FDM solution set.  The company’s other lines will continue to be pet specialty exclusives.  See the full letter here.

To some this will come as a surprise.  After all, the pet industry has relied on well-maintained channel boundaries wherein brands choose to focus on and remain loyal to either pet specialty or FDM as a means of garnering retailer support.  Within these buckets there are soft boundaries between independent pet specialty and major pet specialty and between mass grocery and natural grocery.   When a big brand jumps the turnstile it is a BIG DEAL.  However, in this case it appeared to be inevitable.

When Blue Buffalo went public in 2015, pet superstores accounted for approximately 70% of the company’s revenue and was growing at over 7%.  Fast forward to 2017, and pet superstores are expected to account for less than 55% of total company sales and their growth rate will contract over 6%.  This trend line is not expected to change, with further contraction contemplated going forward.  To offset the challenges within its core channel, Blue Buffalo launched other growth initiatives focused on the veterinary channel and international markets. We viewed these as simply stop-gap measures while the company waited for the right time to make its move to mass.  That time has apparently arrived.  However, it arrived in a somewhat unanticipated way.  Our assumption was that the company would partner with Walmart, but instead it chose Target and conventional grocery.  This leads us to believe that a Walmart launch will be a 2019 event.  Blue Buffalo will wait until its Target and grocery channel account sales anniversary and then launch in other mass accounts, providing them four years of baked in growth optics based on mid-year launches.  That is public company behavior hard at work.  As of this writing the stock is down ~ 2% on the news, but don’t expect it to stay that way.

Now that Blue Buffalo has made its move, the question is what is the competitive response.  Just last week Champion Petfoods and Fromm Family Foods were showered with praise from independent retailers due to their willingness to move off Chewy.com in light of its acquisition by PetSmart.  Just a week later they now are faced with a different decision as they both could undoubtedly enjoy a national roll out at PetSmart, Petco, or both if they are willing to embrace that opportunity.  Other brands that are likely to benefit include Chewy’s own American Journey, which could easily transition to an online/offline brand.  Nulo is another prime candidate given its performance in PetSmart and the emergence of its Freestyle line in independent pet specialty.  Brands like Nulo, who effectively straddle the inner channel boundaries, are likely to welcome the news of a Blue FDM launch.

From a retailer perspective, one has to believe that Blue Buffalo shelf space will decline in the near term, if only as a psychological feel-good moment.  The pet specialty channel has a strong reliance on Blue Buffalo, so it’s ability to have a meaningful response is, to a large extent, muted.  Some back of the envelope math would suggest that nearly 25% of Petco and PetSmart food sales are in Blue Buffalo products.  The likely answer will be less retailer financed marketing support, though Blue Buffalo can take up that spend through national ad campaigns.  Notably, the company intends to begin tagging commercials for its pet specialty exclusive lines with “available at your favorite pet specialty store”.  Independents may have greater perceived influence by curtailing product recommendations, but that only works if they can effectively steer potential customers into alternative brands. Many retailers have found that converting Blue Buffalo customers is harder than it looks.

Finally, we come to the leading FDM brands.  It’s natural to assume that Freshpet, Rachel Ray, and I & Love & You should be concerned.  After all, there is only so much space available for the pet category within these retail environments.  However, each of these companies have forms of differentiation that they can rely on be it form factor or brand attributes, so Blue Buffalo’s ability to drive traffic to the channel may in fact benefit them as consumers begin to rethink the role of their grocery retailer in fulfilling a critical mass of their pet spend basket.

Every day, the pet industry looks less like a behavioral outlier, and more like its human industry peer group.  The change the industry has undergone over the past 12 months is dramatic, but a new end game is starting to come into focus.  That should excite companies with innovative products, salient marketing messages, and strong execution capabilities.  To the victor go the spoils.

ETA: PetSmart bond prices have declined almost 4% since the announcement.

petm

/bryan

Note: This blog is for informational purposes only. The opinions expressed reflect my view as of the publishing date, which are subject to change. While this post utilizes data sources I consider reliable, I cannot guarantee the accuracy of any third party cited herein.

 

fence jumperOn April 18th, PetSmart announced the acquisition of Chewy, Inc., owner and operator of the chewy.com website.  On April 21st, Tuffy’s Pet Food, a brand of KLN Family Brands, announced that it was terminating its partnership with Chewy in what was termed a “show of support for the independent pet specialty channel.”  As a result of the move, KLN received considerable positive press, and likely bolstered its standing among independent retailers.  The first mover often enjoys the disproportionate amount of the spoils.

While it is unlikely that anyone predicted Tuffy’s would be first to find the exit, let alone do it so quickly, undoubtedly the buyer and seller had to assume that there would be customer loss associated with a transaction of this nature.  The issue really was not whether Tuffy’s was going to stay or go, but whether widely distributed brands who generate a meaningful portion of their sales online would continue with the platform.  Other likely defectors were going to come from brands that call Petco home, and therefore have no existing distribution in PetSmart. There was established precedent here.  When PetSmart acquired Pet360, several brands opted out of the platform.

To the informed, this put the focus on Champion Petfoods, Fromm Family Foods, and Merrick Pet Care.  The later because it continued to be a Petco exclusive, even after its acquisition by Nestle Purina.  At issue for the former two was the fact that Chewy represented a significant customer, and likely its fastest growing.  On July 10th, both Champion and Fromm disclosed, through different mechanisms, that they had in fact exited their relationship with chewy.com due to their individual commitments to the independent pet specialty channel.  The Facebook pages of both brands lit up with comments expressing both adulation and disdain for the move.  Rumor is that Chewy was encouraging platform loyalists to express their displeasure online.

Reaction to the news was quick to fill up my inbox, suggesting that this was an unforeseen circumstance and would likely lead down the path of a write-down for PetSmart on its acquisition.  Given that both brands defected when PetSmart acquired Pet360, I suggest that this circumstance was likely known, or at the very least contemplated, from the outset.  If not, someone was negligent in doing their due diligence.  More than likely this impacts Chewy’s ability to earn any contingent consideration tied to revenue or customer retention.  Potentially it hastens Ryan Cohen’s path to exiting the business he founded and that made him wealthy, assuming he is only sticking around to get the last dollar out of the deal.

In sorting out the winners and loser of these decisions, there is less clarity than one might expect.  The impact would, to a large extent, depend on what you believe the physical and emotional substitutes are for the end customer.  If the customer is tied to the brand, the beneficiaries will be the independent retailers as the brands intended it to be.  These brands are staples of the independent channel and vital to their competitive advantage. However, if cost and convenience trump (no pun intended) brand loyalty, Chewy has the potential to transition pet owners to other premium and super premium brands that remain in their stable, including their own product set American Journey. Many of the comments on the Facebook pages of Champion and Fromm suggest customers are considering a switch, but that may be motivated by the catalyst above. I would also argue that Phillips Feed Service’s acquisition of Petflow looks better by the day. They should see owners transition to the petflow.com platform, as they are competitive on price with chewy.com, but it might also motivate independent pet stores to adopt their Endless Aisles solution set, seeking to step into the Chewy void for these brands.  However, if Champion and Fromm use this shake-up as an opportunity to begin directly selling their product to end customers, the end results may not be known for some time.

It is natural to seek to look at the above situation and try and paint Chewy and/or PetSmart as “the bad guy”.  However, I would argue that a healthy chewy.com is good for the entire pet industry offering consumers additional choice in the form of an alternative sales channel, and pushing back on price in an industry that has experienced considerable price inflation post-recession.  Without Chewy, the price of Champion and Fromm products is likely to increase, at least online, and that is not a favorable outcome for pet owners no matter how you slice up the pie.

/bryan

Note: This blog is for informational purposes only. The opinions expressed reflect my view as of the publishing date, which are subject to change. While this post utilizes data sources I consider reliable, I cannot guarantee the accuracy of any third party cited herein.

 

 

 

 

m8bA common refrain in the pet industry is that to predict the future of the consumables category, you need only to look back on the prevailing human trends three years prior. Today, I would argue that this rule-of-thumb applies more broadly, to a cross section of pet industry categories, than previously appreciated. As an example, the rise of ecommerce in the pet industry follows a similar trajectory to a number of human categories that were thought to be “Amazon proof”.  This is why I think pet industry participants should be paying attention to recent funding deals for Freshly, Inc., whose $77 million Series D was led by Nestle, USA, and Chef’d, LLC, whose $17.6 million Series B was led by Campbell Soup Company.

Both Freshly and Chef’d are in the business of delivering fresh food to your door step.  In the case of Freshly, these are fresh prepared meals, which require minimal intervention to get them from the packaging to the plate.  Chef’d delivers personalized meal-kits, which you then prepare at home, in as little as 10 minutes.  As a side note, I’ve never completed a meal kit from any company in under an hour, but maybe that says more about my cooking skills than anything else. Notably Chef’d partners with culinary and media personalities to create menu inspirations.  That said, what these companies deliver is less interesting than who is financing the growth of their business.

Large human food companies have significantly increased their investment activity in emerging food brands over the past 24 months.  Major industry players have set up dedicated investing units to source and evaluate opportunities.  The human food industry has largely outsourced its research and development function to start-ups who are seeking to capitalize on emerging consumer trends.  These companies become investment or acquisition targets if their solution set demonstrates the ability to resonate with a large enough audience and if their production processes can scale.  However, this pattern has, to-date, largely been confined to product companies.  Freshly and Chef’d are direct-to-consumer distribution companies cloaked in a product orientation.

The pet industry has its Freshly and Chef’d corollaries.  Companies like JustFoodForDogs and The Farmer’s Dog, have both recently received major cash infusions from financial players.  There are numerous others competing for this emerging space — Ollie Pet, NomNomNow, PetPlate, to name a few.  Yet, I believe the investment trend illustrated by the Freshly and Chef’d transactions tells us more about the real value of scale direct-to-consumer businesses such as A Place for Rover and Bark & Co., than the potential for fresh food delivery in the pet category, whose future we also think is bright.

What the pet food and products manufacturers have in common with their human counterparts is their core means of distribution are under siege by small retailers who provide better service and/or in-store experience as well as by the internet.  As such, any opportunity to get directly to the end customer is highly coveted, and therefore of great value. Within the pet category, there are a very limited set of players that have proven their ability to directly access a critical mass of pet owners.  Therefore, as large manufacturers look for direct-to-consumer exposure they will be left with a choice of ascribing a very high value to an asset with breadth or taking a calculated risk on an upstart.

What these large strategics are looking for is the ability to build a relationship directly with a consumer that is tied solely to the product or offering, and that exists outside of that buyer’s relationship with any retailer, physical or digital. If they own the customer they can look to monetize him or her in a variety of ways, capturing more the the margin along the way. We believe this trend to be applicable to both product and service providers in the pet category.

The question then becomes what would a tie-up between a Mars/Purina/J.M. Smucker Company and a Rover/Bark & Co. mean for the acquired entity.  Would consumers have the same affinity for their Bark Box if it only included treats from the buyer organization, or is the lack of affiliation that part of the value proposition?  We don’t know the answer to that question, but if we follow the story of Freshly and Chef’d going forward, we may well find out.

/bryan

Note: This blog is for informational purposes only. The opinions expressed reflect my view as of the publishing date, which are subject to change. While this post utilizes data sources I consider reliable, I cannot guarantee the accuracy of any third party cited herein.

 

dylan“The times they are a-changin” – Bob Dylan

Industry analysis is easy when everything is moving up and to the right.  When market conditions are such that a rising tide does not float all boats, it is harder to draw conclusions that are applicable to a broad set of market participants.  The pet industry now finds itself in an operating environment where company execution will most likely determine the winners in this phase of the cycle.

The  pet industry has hit a transformative moment.  The humanization movement, though it continues to be cited regularly, has achieved its point of arrival — pets are treated like members of the family.  Kids today only know of pets as their equal.  As a result, there are no longer large cohorts of pet owners who are available to upgrade.  At the same time, younger generations now represent the largest segment of pet owners, and they think and act differently than their parents generations.  However, they also lack the same disposable financial resources, meaning they have to make tradeoffs today.

These realities are changing the power paradigm in the category.  The pet consumer is in the ascendancy at the expense of all others who participate in the supply chain.  Today the pet owner is able to choose among channels and brands based in their personal values.  Effectively product access has been commoditized. Consumers are now able to dictate to manufacturers what attributes they seek, not vice-versa.  In the future this paradigm will move across the sub-categories within in pets to redefine who wins and who gets left behind.

When market dynamics shift with significant force, it usually leads to elevated levels of industry consolidation. The 2015 – 2016 period was the greatest period of consolidation the industry has witnessed, and we expect that will continue.  With that as a backdrop, we present our pet industry capital market themes for the Spring of 2017:

  • Major Pet Specialty Franchises Struggling. It was not long ago that PetSmart and Petco could do no wrong. The major pet specialty chains were posting SSS comps that were the envy of retail analysts; the gap between the two biggest pet retailers and the balance of the industry seemed vast and unbridgeable. How quickly things can change. Over the past three years, major pet specialty has watched its franchise erode. Independent pet retailers out-serviced them; FDM retailers poached manufacturers and offered customers a better cost value proposition; and ecommerce providers out-priced and out-“convenienced” them. In 2016, we estimate that PetSmart comped down 3% – 4% (mature stores) and that Petco comps were flat to down 2% (mature stores). With their loan packages trading below par, both companies are under pressure to innovate. Petco’s turnaround strategy appears focused on private label and house brands.  PetSmart is focusing on ecommerce, as evidenced by its acquisition of Chewy. What is clear is that there is no silver bullet for what ails them. Expect things to get worse, before they get better as brands begin to feel pressure to find other sources of growth and as Petco and PetSmart refine their respective strategies.
  • Treat Acquisitions are Focused on Sustainable Competitive Advantage. The treat space has been actively consolidating as manufacturers compete for the discretionary portion of the pet owner’s shopping basket. However, what is rapidly changing is the attributes these consolidators are seeking in their acquisition targets. Deep customer relationships built through an emotive brand are now the table stakes.  Buyers want some form of competitive advantage that has greater barriers to justify prevailing multiples. The acquisition of Salix Animal Health (Spectrum Brands) and Whimzees (WellPet) are examples of this in practice. Other major pet treat IP players, including Petmatrix, are most likely to get snapped up by the large industry players. This will in turn create an opportunity for private equity to acquire mid-stage brands and invest in building these attributes.  The phrase “innovate or perish” has never been truer than in the treat space today.
  • Digital Pet Age Has Arrived. Historically, pet industry incumbents have been dismissive of the potential for category disruption through technology innovation. Major pet retailers were not well situated to sell the solution set; legacy pet ownership generations, the Baby Boomers, did not understand it; market leaders were not organized to innovate into the category. As a result, Chewy, A Place for Rover, Bark Box, Whistle, and their peers rose up to fill the market void, creating substantial shareholder value as pet ownership dynamics shifted to favor the digital generations. In 2016, $154 million dollars was invested in 46 pet-tech deals, a pace that has been increasing since 2012. Even in its nascency the pet tech movement is showing signs of making a lasting impact. As Millennials further outpace Baby Boomers in terms of pet ownership, digital will gain more momentum in the pet category. This realization will leave strategic buyers who have not made a tech play scrambling to play catch-up.  This trend augers well for acquisition valuations in this sector of the market.
  • Expect M&A Transaction Velocity to Remain High. Since 2014, transaction bias in the pet industry has been towards M&A. 2015 – 2016 was the greatest period of industry consolidation as measured by transaction volume. As company’s reposition themselves to compete in a rapidly changing landscape, we expect elevated M&A activity to continue in 2017. Market leaders will seek to plug remaining portfolio gaps while small and midsized players will be looking to exit at the tail end of the cycle. While acquisitions may be plentiful, there will also be a flight to quality with differentiated assets – brand, scale, channel (direct or proprietary) – garnering premium valuations, while those lacking it face commodity multiples. If the U.S. implements tax reform, volume should spike across asset classes providing private equity a unique opportunity to buy into the category.  Financial buyers will be banking on these assets to carry them through the next recession.

As always, our full pet industry report is available by request.

/bryan

Note: This blog is for informational purposes only. The opinions expressed reflect my view as of the publishing date, which are subject to change. While this post utilizes data sources I consider reliable, I cannot guarantee the accuracy of any third party cited herein.

sbmIf you have not seen the digital age in pet coming, it’s arrival has now been fully announced.  In the past year, a remarkable number of meaningful events have happened to punctuate it’s arrival.  Many of those events were likely to have gone unnoticed at the time, but in aggregate its hard to ignore.  Notably the past last year was book-ended on one end by Mars acquisition of Whistle Labs (March 31, 2016) and the merger of A Place for Rover and Dog Vacay (March 29, 2017) on the other end.  In between we have witnessed the rise of Chewy.com at the expense of Petco, PetSmart, and even Amazon; Phillips Feed Services acquisition of Petflow for the purpose of arming independent retailers for the digital pet race; and a total $154 million dollars invested in 46 pet-tech deals.

Pet-Tech-Annualnew

Historically, it has been easy to dismiss the digital pet movement as a novelty act, confined to products whose addressable market was small and whose value proposition was narrow.  It’s true that many of the first generation products were poorly designed or over engineered, and generally expensive.  Further, the arrival of pet tech was slowed by the inability of core pet retailers to sell the solution set.  Simply stated, Petco and PetSmart were not well set up to educate consumers on why they needed to own a $200 smart feeder or a $150 remote treating system.  Further, technology retailers, such as Best Buy, knew very little about the category and were therefore unable to effectively merchandise a pet technology set.

Despite these impediments, it’s hard to argue with the results of the market leaders.  Whistle Labs was acquired by Mars for $117 million, representing a high single digit multiple of revenue.  As we detailed in our last post, Chewy.com has achieved over 50% market share in online sales and anticipates 2017 sales of $1.5 billion. Finally, A Place for Rover (Rover.com) was valued at more then $308 million its $40 million Series E financing closed in October 2016.  Rover also announced that it acquired its primary domestic competitor Dog Vacay in a stock-for-stock transaction. In our discussion with other pet technology companies many of them appear poised to deliver strong growth and financial results in 2017.

The collective impact of these digital pet companies and their ascendancy in terms of industry importance can no longer be ignored.  While the negative comps produced by both Petco and PetSmart in 2016, and the recent deterioration of their leveraged loan valuations, can be attributed to a variety of factors, it’s hard to argue that the rise of Chewy.com and the lack of traffic drivers attractive to the Millennials, and subsequent generations, such as pet technology products, has been a key contributor.  The fact that the vast majority of pet food brands are available online, making their availability more commoditized, and not an influencer of store visits, is exacerbating the problem.  Further, Rover and DogVacay have served to disrupt the discretionary services segment of the market, for whom Petco and PetSmart (both boarding and grooming), along with VCA Antech (boarding) and Banfield Animal Health (boarding),  are the most established players.  Prior to the take private, PetSmart generated $750+ million in services revenue annually, accounting for ~ 12% of revenues.

The ability of incumbent players to catch-up digitally is limited.  Earnings based companies are hesitant to acquire companies without an established track record of profitability given their valuation paradigms consist of multiples of EBITDA or contribution margin.  Mars benefited from its private nature when considering the acquisition of Whistle.   A subset of major players we have spoken to are waiting around for these companies to stumble in hopes of acquiring them at bargain prices.  While companies like Chewy.com have “scraped paint” in the past, we see this strategy as unlikely to succeed in the near to medium term.  Those who are called to action, but partially paralyzed by their valuation paradigms will seek to partner.  Whether creating these bridges will be enough to move the needle or insulate them from risk remains to be seen.

/bryan

Note: This blog is for informational purposes only. The opinions expressed reflect my view as of the publishing date, which are subject to change. While this post utilizes data sources I consider reliable, I cannot guarantee the accuracy of any third party cited herein.

 

Next Page »