CPO2In prior posts we have explored the notion that pet industry transaction volume is accelerating, and by all available measures in fact it is.  We have also delved into rumors of a public offering by Blue Buffalo later this year, noting the lack of public traded pure play pet companies. On Tuesday, Trupanion, a venture backed provider of health insurance for dogs and cats, announced it intended to file for an IPO on the New York Stock Exchange. We are also aware of at least one other company in the process of filing, and the concept of going public has been increasingly discussed in my industry coverage meetings.  This begs the question, are the public markets the most viable exit opportunity for a variety of midsized pet companies?

What is most notable about the Trupanion filing is the size of the company.  The business, of which I am a customer, disclosed that it was covering 181,634 pets as of March 31, 2014 and generated revenue of $83.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2013. On a quarterly basis, the company said it has posted quarter-over-quarter revenue growth since the first quarter of 2010. In the most recent quarter, ended March 31, the company reported revenue of $25.6 million, a 44% increase from the same period a year earlier.  However, also in the disclosure was the insight that the company lost $8.2 million in 2013 and has never made money.  That said, Trupanion has a huge intangible data asset, having covered a large population of pets for nearly 14 years; data that would be highly valuable to a variety of players in the pet supply chain. That notwithstanding, it is hard to believe that Trupanion, even at the most generous valuations, is going to achieve an offering price that results in a market capitalization that will motivate meaningful analyst coverage, given its size and earnings profile. Trupanion’s primary competitor, the larger Veterinary Pet Insurance Company, remains private. Other pet insurance companies have not met with favorable results in the public markets due, primarily in my estimation, size.

Often public filings are practical way of putting a “For Sale” sign on a business. Whether or not this is Trupanion’s intention, the mere optionality of a public listing would act as another catalyst for industry transaction volume.  Further, if successful it could pave the way for other midsized pet companies to explore the go public alternative.  Certainly companies such as Radio Systems Corp, Hartz Mountain (which is owned by publicly traded Uni-Charm Corporation) and United Pet Products (owned by publicly traded Spectrum Brands) would be well situated to tap the public markets for liquidity or acquisition capital. Further, brands such as Champion Pet Food, Dosckocil Manufacturing, Freshpet, Kong Company, Nature’s Variety and Merrick Pet Care would gain another exit alternative.

The analysis above separates the issues of “could” from “should”. While Trupanion has a clear path to a diversified growth plan through its data asset, the ability to sustain public company momentum for many of the companies listed above is limited. We have already questioned whether the much bigger Blue Buffalo can remain channel tied as a public company and it dwarfs most of the above listed companies in size and brand awareness.  However, more public pet companies would be good for the industry, which generally lacks a broad set of consolidators.

/bryan

 

 

 

 

chicken_little_funny-t2Last week, PetSmart announced first quarter earnings. The company reported slowing growth and negative same store sales.  I believe it was the first negative comp quarter in 16 years for PetSmart. Management took full year comp store guidance down to zero, from 2%. The stock fell approximately 8% on the news, taking the year-to-date loss to -22%. Naturally, this has led some to question whether the sky is falling for PetSmart, the pet industry, or b0th.  To begin to answer these questions, we first need to uncouple them.

To assess the performance of PetSmart, separate and distinct from the industry, the best place to start seems to be in the context of broader retail.  Anyone who was surprised by softness in PetSmart’s numbers has probably not been keeping their pulse on the four wall retail environment. In January, 20 retailers pre-announced earnings shortfalls. This was the highest number post recession and on par with the levels the industry experienced in third and fourth quarter 2008. Howard Schultz blamed it on the Internet, others cited weather, consumer confidence, and wage stagnation. Notably, both Wal Mart (-0.4%) and Target (-2.5%) produced negative comps for the 1Q2014. We cataloged 1Q2014 revenue growth, EPS growth and performance versus guidance of some of the major big box retailers here — 1Q Retail EPS Performance. Notably, PetSmart was the only company within this comp group to exceed guidance on earnings. What this speaks to is the fact that PetSmart has a very good handle on the cost side of their business. While they experienced slight margin compression, unlike its peers PetSmart does not appear to be chasing the middle market consumer through a promotional discounting strategy. This underscores PetSmart’s relative market position in the industry as well as the ongoing attractiveness of the pet category.

When we shift our analytical purview to the broader industry, the cause and effect relationship is more apparent. While total consumer spending on pet products and services continues on a positive growth trajectory, total growth has been slowing, driven by a falling comps for pet products (see graph below).  What this demonstrates is that the industry is maturing and that drivers are changing.  As the pet food upgrade cycle has tapered products sales growth has slowed.  However, as a wellness focus has ascended, services revenue growth has accelerated.  Given that services is a much smaller part of PetSmart’s mix, it was bound to experience the malaise of the industry’s product sales growth trajectory.  PetSmart’s first quarter revenue growth was more or less inline with the growth in industry product sales.  Additionally, keep in mind that total pet industry sales, as measured by consumer expenditures by category, grew 12.6% between 2011 and 2013; at some point the “law of large numbers” catches up to everyone.Slide1A second lens we like to use to assess pet industry performance is the rate of adoptions.  An increase in ownership and multi-pet householders means an increase in expenditures.  However, as evidenced by the chart below, the growth rate for companion animal adoptions, as measured by shelters monitored by Pethealth, Inc., slowed markedly in 1Q2014, especially for dogs.  That said, a similar contraction was evident in 2011, a year of strong industry growth (4.7% according to the American Pet Products Association).  As such, we think it is too early to call it a year for the industry, but in combination with slowing pet products sales it is cause for some consternation.Slide2In looking at the total body of available data there is reason to be concerned about the pace of pet industry growth but not the overall health of the industry.  Slower growth has been anticipated and therefore should not come as a surprise. The industry has been defying skeptics for sometime, but all good things experience a tapering.  Further, it is too early to call the year from any analytical perspective.  The pet industry remains very attractive long term and while online players, adjacent market competitors, and emerging brands have eroded the leadership of both major retailers and product manufacturers, the threat to their overall industry position remains low.  Generally speaking, physical retail has experience a much more significant contraction, driven by share shift to mobile and online, recently even after you factor out the weather.  In that context one can view PetSmart’s performance in a relatively positive light.

I think I can say with authority, when it comes to all things pet there may be clouds in the sky, but it is not currently falling.

/bryan

iamsA theme we have been emphasizing in our missives about the pet industry has been the concept of change. Industries evolve for a variety of reasons — innovation, regulation, exogenic shock, mergers/acquisitions, among others. Our view is that the pet industry is changing for another reason — slower growth. The key drivers of pet industry performance over the past five years — the humanization of pets and the pet food upgrade cycle — appear to have peaked and, as a result, we are seeing divergent performance among industry participants as new core themes take hold; innovators continue to take share from incumbents. A logical reaction to this state of play is an increase in deal velocity — incumbents buy innovators, investors fund innovators to accelerate their existing or potential advantage, and large companies consolidate to drive economies of scale. Notably that is exactly what we are seeing and some of those deals could have far reaching implications. The case of Mars, Inc. buying the Proctor & Gamble pet portfolio is an example of this reality in practice.

When Mars acquired 80% of P&G’s pet food portfolio for $2.9 billion, it should have come as no surprise P&G was largely exiting the pet space. P&G management had been actively seeking to pair its exposure to non-core lines of business and a buyer for their pet brands has been sought for several years. That Mars was on the other side of the transaction, was not a real surprise. After all, only a small handful of companies in the space could have taken a deal of this size down, Mars being one of them. However, Mars has been increasingly active in its food business overseas at the expense of its pet portfolio so many discounted the possibility. On its face, the deal appears to be attractive for Mars. Among the acquired brands, Iams fits nicely into their merchandise matrix, and mitigates the risk they would fall to the number three player in the most important pet market should Big Heart Brands have scooped up the assets. Eukanuba is largely redundant and Natura is a wild card given its recent recalls. What we suspect happened was Mars had sought to buy Iams for some time, and eventually the sides agreed to a deal where P&G threw in more assets (Eukanuba and Natura) and Mars, in turn, agreed to throw in more money. The $1.6 billion portfolio sold for 2.25x revenue after considering the retention of ownership.

While the deal backdrop consists of some mildly compelling drama, more interesting is what it all could mean in terms of change. Of significance, Mars is largely focused on the mass channel, and logic would dictate that they would seek to move Natura into mass at a lower price point. Given the recalls that is where Natura might have some residual value. That scenario could have significant implications for pet specialty assuming a Natura launch is a prelude to other natural brands entering the FDM channel under their flagship brand. The would be a big win for consumers — premium natural pet food at a mass price. This would add additional fuel to the notion that Blue Buffalo, if public, would pursue this very strategy. Further, Big Heart Brands, through its Natural Balance transaction, would be well situated to join this movement despite the promise to keep the brand in channel. The net result is the potential for both share and channel shift but also pet food deflation. Falling food prices would have significant implications for major pet specialty and independents. On a price per pound basis, premium food trades at 2x-3x price premium and a 2×-2.5x profit premium. Price compression would therefore have a significant impact on margin for pet specialty players.

We concede that the scenario above is speculative, but one that increasingly has the potential to be realized in whole or in part. Further, it is one that we would not have given much consideration 12 months ago that everyone should now take seriously.

/bryan

images7CBOOO04

With the benefit of hindsight, we know the pet industry produced another solid year for performance in 2013, generating growth of 4.5%.  Industry revenues climbed to $55.7 billion, with growth exceeding forecast by 0.2%.  Revenues benefited from inflation of 1.3%, including food price inflation of 1.1%.  Growth was relatively uniform across the core segments with services (+5.0%) and veterinary care (+4.9%) leading the way.  While growth is projected to accelerate to 5.0% in 2014, we expect companies in the space to experience more widely divergent fates.  Our thesis is that the industry is undergoing structural changes that will result in stronger performance from the leaders and slower performance from the laggards.

Structural change is being driven by slower growth in the key drivers of performance over the past five years.  On the retail side, we are seeing smaller retail chains ascend at the expense of large pet specialty players. Notably, PetSmart same-store-sales slowed to 2.0% in 2H2013.  In contrast, PetSmart produced, on average, quarterly same-store-sales growth of 5.2%  from fiscal 2010 through 2Q2013.  Further, among top 25 pet retailers, 55% of box growth came outside of Petco/PetSmart in 2013, up from 41% in 2011. Finally, ecommerce growth in pet products is expected to accelerate from 35% in 2013 to 38% in 2014 as online pet venues both consolidate and proliferate.

Product manufacturers are also experiencing the impetus for change.  Looking for new sources of growth they are pursuing new channel strategies.  Big Heart Brands’ acquisition of Natural Balance Pet Foods and Nestle Purina PetCare’s acquisition of Zuke’s underscore this theme.  Notably,  the number of companies with pet specialty distribution that exhibited at Expo West (meaning they are looking for Whole Foods distribution) doubled in 2014. Additionally, the pending Blue Buffalo initial public offering is, in our view, a prelude for the brands entry to mass. Collectively, these companies will blur the lines between sales channels for pet consumers.

Net net, change is the air and change drives deal velocity. Below are the other key pet industry trends for 2014:

  • Prelude for Sale or a Move to Mass? In March, news leaked that Blue Buffalo Company Ltd. had selected underwriters for an anticipated 2014 initial public offering. When the company took a leveraged dividend in 2012, we predicted a sale or filing within three years. Blue generated $600 million in sales in 2013 and EBITDA margins are said to be nearing 20%. The company is approaching the size of The Nutro Company when it was acquired by Mars, Inc. While Blue has no lack of suitors, the purported asking price of $1.5 – $2.0 billion would be hard for even the largest companies to swallow in an environment where product recalls can rapidly erode brand equity. A listing would place a public sale price on the business, which may facilitate a transaction, but we think the more likely outcome is that Blue is headed to mass. The growth requirements for a public company are more than the pet specialty channel alone can support. If the brand jumps to FDM under its existing label, which we think is possible, you can add another brick in the wall of change.
  • Natural Leads Grocery Resurgence. Grocery has been steadily losing market share to pet specialty post recession. Simply put, FDM has been out-thought and out-merchandised. Lacking access to key independent brands coupled with limited selection depth, consumers have migrated their spend elsewhere. Grocery buyers and store planners did not recognize the strategic value in the pet aisle. However, this is changing. Major chains such as Kroger and Whole Foods have or are set to launch large pet assortments made up of staple, emerging, and house brands system-wide. Increasingly, brands are being built for the grocery channel or seeking to make the jump. Notably, the number of pet consumables companies exhibiting at Expo West doubled in 2014. Given its size and a lack of compelling incumbent brands, the pull of the FDM channel is strong. As the channel regains momentum outside of the natural and gourmet segments, it has the potential to change where consumers shop for premium and how brands are built.
  • Change Will Drive Deals. As manufacturers, retailers, distributors, and brands seek to align themselves with emerging realities, we expect to see increased deal activity. Deal velocity in sectors such as consumables should accelerate both acquisitions and private placements. Specialty retail, a sector whose transaction volume has been rather muted, should see a resurgence as leading micro-box and online platforms enjoy increased capital formation to expand their footprint or are acquired by mass and major pet specialty retailers seeking to expand omni-channel capabilities. For the most attractive properties, valuations will increase due to broader and deeper interest from buyers and investors.

Contact me for a copy for my report.

/bryan

Sources: APPA, Cleveland Research, New Hope Natural Media, Pet Business, Reuters, U.S. Bureau of Economic Activity

accross the pongI often talk about PetSmart and VCA Antech being proxies for the direction and health of the domestic pet market because of the transparency it provides us into consumer pet product and healthcare spend through quarterly earnings reports and third party equity research.  However, the U.S. market should not be viewed as a proxy for the global pet industry.  Absent the transparency we enjoy through publicly traded U.S. pet companies our view of global pet markets is tied to a reliance on third party data firms (Euromonitor, Mintel, etc.). While these firms produce excellent research, there is an inherent latency to their content, making it hard to measure real time performance.  A partial solution to that problem looks to be coming in the form of a public listing for the UKs largest pet retailer, Pets At Home, Ltd. (“PAH”).

Earlier this week PAH filed for an initial public offering on the London Stock Exchange.  The company plans to raise £275 million, giving PAH a valuation of around £1.5 billion. Thew company operates 369 retail stores, 246 small animal veterinary centers and 116 in-store grooming salons across Britain.  Estimates puts the company’s share of its home pet retail market at around 12%. The British market is highly fragmented, with PAH’s five largest competitors totaling just 225 stores combined. The company should have ample opportunity to grow both its retail base and veterinary services concept given these market dynamics. PAH plans to open an additional 131 stores, 400 veterinary clinics, and 200 grooming salons.  The company would be the only listed pet retailer in Europe.

PAH was acquired by a private equity consortium led by U.S. based Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co (“KKR”), which also owns Big Heart Brands, the Del Monte Foods pet products division, in January 2010 for £960 million.  At the time, the company had trailing twelve month revenues of £402 million and EBITDA of £70 million, resulting in an implied valuation of 2.4x Revenue and 13.6x EBITDA.  Bridgeport Equity, the seller, had acquired the business for £230 million in July 2004. Assuming a £1.5 billion enterprise value for PAH, it would imply that the value of the business has increased over 55% since being taken over by KKR and friends.

According to the recently announced listing, PAH had sales of £598 million for its year ending on March 28, 2013. The company said its revenue increased 11.7% for 40-week period ending on January 2, 2104.  Extrapolating this growth for the full year yields revenue of approximately £700 million, resulting in an implied valuation at listing of 2.14x Revenue. At the time of its listing PAH expects EBITDA of £110 million, resulting in an implied valuation of 13.6x EBITDA.  This would value PAH at multiples nearly two times those prevailing for U.S. leader PetSmart (1.0x Revenue and 7.3x EBITDA) despite the two companies having similar same-store-sales for the prior 12 month period.  While PAH has produced better topline growth over the past year versus PetSmart and enjoys a better profit margin profile due to its services revenue, this still amounts to a very healthy premium even after you account for the 17% decline in PetSmart’s stock since October 2013.

Whether PAH is overvalued or correctly valued is likely a debate with no end, the truth likely lies somewhere in the middle.  Either way, KKR has made a handsome return in a short period, even after you consider the company has reinvested over £100 million in growth initiatives.  However, the real value for those that follow the industry, will be increased data and transparency.  While PAH’s market capitalization will be approximately 37% of PetSmart’s, it should receive solid coverage from equity analysts with strong UK sales and trading networks.  That coverage will help us better pinpoint how the British pet market is performing, and ultimately enable us to draw parallels between a key foreign market and our own as well as the leading retailers in both geographies.

/bryan

playbookIn October, Del Monte Foods announced that they had sold their fruit and vegetable business for $1.68 billion.  While the world will still have Del Monte canned pineapple, whole kernel corn, and Contadina tomatoes to enjoy in perpetuity, the transaction speaks volumes about the attractiveness of the pet food business relative to its human corollary.  Del Monte’s pet products business will now operate under the Big Heart Pet Brands banner.

You may recall that back in 2010, when Del Monte Foods was taken private by a private equity syndicate headed by Kohlberg Kravis & Roberts (http://wp.me/piXtL-dU), I postulated that the deal was not about shelf stable fruits and vegetables but a bet on the macro fundamentals of the pet industry.  The sale of Del Monte’s Consumer Products business validates my thesis, as does the recent acquisition of Natural Balance Pet Food.  The real question is what comes next?

As a general rule, private equity backed companies are not keen to keep cash on their balance sheets.  Excess cash is used to make acquisitions, delever, or ends up as dividends to shareholders.  Given the size of the slimmed down Del Monte post sale (some $1.8 billion in revenue), I don’t see the later two options as being viable alternatives. As such, I expect that Del Monte will be an active player in the pet consolidation market, and with that much cheese at its disposal the target list includes brands others cannot contemplate.  So who will Del Monte buy? We handicap the candidates:

  • Blue Buffalo. The Blue is the biggest and best name on the block. Not a month goes by without a rumor surrounding the prospects of a Blue Buffalo acquisition by a major CPG company, but the reality is that the company has limited options for suitors at the purported price tag — $3.0+ billion.  Could Del Monte take it down?  Yes.  Will they? Unlikely.  First, Del Monte’s pet line-up is very much about a product portfolio and spending all your allowance on one product company runs a bit counter to that premise. Second, private equity backed companies do not have a propensity for being top payors.  When Del Monte acquired Natural Balance for $341 million, they paid between 1.0x – 1.5x Revenue.  I’m not sure what multiple of EBITDA a $3.0 billion deal for Blue implies, but it would be far greater than the 9.0x the private equity syndicated paid for Del Monte.  While Del Monte established the market multiples that pet companies aspire to achieve through their acquisitions of Meow Mix and Milk Bone, I don’t see them doing a highly dilutive deal with Blue Buffalo; the cost benefit tradeoff is misaligned. Odds: Not good.
  • Natura Pet Foods. The fate of Proctor & Gamble’s pet food portfolio has been a source of constant speculation.  P&G was rumored to be considering offloading its pet business when they acquired Natura Pet Foods in 2010 (http://wp.me/piXtL-cJ), which some took as an about face. They never integrated Natura, which would make it the most likely candidate among the P&G portfolio to be acquired.  Natura would provide Del Monte another power house brand in premium natural, but of greater significance is the fact it would be buying a portfolio of products (EVO, Innova, California Natural, Healthwise), not a single brand.  This would also enable Del Monte to keep Natural Balance in pet specialty, as the Natura portfolio would meet the same needs in mass.  This strategy runs into two problems, one from each side of the transaction.  First, Natura was the subject of one of the widest recalls ever in June of this year, when the company voluntarily recalled every product it made with an expiration date before June 10, 2014. It was their fourth Natura recall in as many months.  Would Del Monte buy a dented egg?  For the right price I suspect they would.  Second, a sale of Natura would only generate proceeds of less than $500 million, a rounding error for P&G, and therefore not much motivation to transact.  Odds: Possible not probable.
  • Iams Pet Foods/Eukanuba. In contrast to a Natura transaction, the sale of Iams and Eukanuba would likely fetch between $3.0 – $3.5 billion ($2.5 – $3.0 billion of that being Iams). This would be worthy of some attention for both sides. Merging Iams/Eukanuba with Del Monte’s pet food brands would make it the number two player in the market, with 20% share versus 35% for Nestle Purina Pet Care. Notwithstanding my comment about check size above, this deal would be tempting for Del Monte to consider. Iams and Eukaneuba generated approximately $2 billion in revenue in 2012 (allocating the other $300 million of segment revenues to Natura), and therefore would be attractively priced, consistent with the Natural Balance transaction. Notably, in July 2013, Del Monte tabbed Giannella Alvarez as Executive Vice President and General Manager of the Pet Business.  As part of her work history, Ginnaella spent time at P&G, albeit involved in a Latin American paper joint venture, but she may have some relevant connectivity to current leadership. However, a deal of that size would likely require the private equity owners of Del Monte to invest more equity, something private equity firms can be loathe to do.  The transaction timeline would also be elongated by anti-trust concerns.  While this deal makes a lot of sense, there are clear barriers to a transaction.  Odds: Possible.
  • Champion Pet Foods. The brand that few talk about in this conversation is Champion Pet Foods, which manufacturers and markets the Orijen and Acana brands of super premium pet food.  Champion was acquired by Bedford Capital Management in 2012, and the business has grown rapidly since the transition, benefiting from Natura’s channel exit and growing distribution offset by production complications related to a plant fire in December 2012. Champion’s regional formulations may not create production economies of scale (yet), but they garner a premium price among consumers who value a limited ingredient solution with a known sourcing pedigree.  While Del Monte wants scale in the brands it acquires, Champion is growing quickly and will become a target of major pet CPG companies over the next 12 – 24 months.  An acquisition would provide Del Monte a very compelling product stack in pet specialty.  Odds: Long, but logical.

Net net, post sale transaction Del Monte finds itself in an enviable position — with both cash and intent.  I do not expect that the company will rush into any transaction, but they have to buy and given the limited competition for premium assets in the space, look for them to strike while the iron is hot, or at least warm.

/bryan

down but not outEarlier this week, PetSmart’s public equity was downgraded by Deutsche Bank equity research analyst Mike Baker. Baker put a “Sell” rating on the stock, reducing his 12-month price target price from $73 to $65, or approximately 11%. In formulating his rationale, Baker cites two main drivers.  First, he views recent traffic erosion at the best in class pet retailer as being a longer term trend as opposed to a short term aberration.  Baker anticipates that slowing sales in super premium pet food coupled with limited food price inflation is going to make 2014 comps hard to deliver.  He views premium food as a key traffic driver for PetSmart. Second, Baker believes that the long term threat of ecommerce in the pet space is real.  He states that once consumers begin to recognize that free shipping is available on most pet food orders that adoption rates will increase.  Baker cites a Pethealth, Inc. survey wherein 89% of pet owners would purchase pet food online if shipping were free.

Notably, Baker’s has been negative on the stock for some time.  He’s had a “Hold” rating on the stock since February 2011 when Petsmart’s public equity was trading at $42, versus the $72 it was trading at prior to Baker’s downgrade.  As such, he missed a 71% movement in the stock over that time period.  While the arguments above are not new (maybe you actually read them here over a year ago), they are real.  However, as I have come to believe there is more to the story, and PetSmart may have more mechanisms available to combat these trends or find other growth avenues than one might expect.  Further, Baker’s call comes at a time where there is a lot of noise in the market, and therefore the significance of his observations from a timing perspective may, in fact be, overblown.  I explore each of these concepts below:

  • Holiday retail was weak all over.  First and foremost fourth quarter was tough for premises based retailers.  Fewer shopping days between Thanksgiving and Christmas, weather problems across the country, and political problems in Washington all conspired to make things tough on four wall retailers.  November store comps across all retailers missed guidance and online took share as a result of time compression and weather impediments.  While we are readily aware that ecommerce is growing faster than traditional retail, there is a lot of noise in the numbers; once that noise dies down we expect PetSmart to do just fine versus guidance.  Baker did not mention the bathwater when he threw out the baby.
  • Premium food rotation is slowing but growth levers in the category remain.  We were ahead of the curve in calling a category slowdown, but our experience has been that the slow of erosion has not been as steep as anticipated.  The category, which at one time was likely growing 25%, is estimated to grow at between 15% – 18% in 2014, a decent clip.  History has demonstrated that major pet specialty retailers still have levers to pull to combat this trend. PetSmart is pursing private/exclusive label concepts in the category, expansion of space dedicated to felines, and alternative form factors/niche brands as a means to combat slowing growth.  The fact they are undertaking a large consumables reset tells me they saw this coming. Further, with a rising stock market and falling unemployment what is not to say that retailers won’t seek price increases absent commodity inflation?  Nothing really. 
  • Other drivers of traffic and earnings remain.  PetSmart has done a great job over the past cycle driving traffic organically.  They have not become overly aggressive with promotions and they are not buying business by offering emerging products companies sweetheart deals or subsidizing ecommerce.  Their exclusive brands are a strong driver of customer visits and will likely be extended in both new and current categories.  Further, as they ramp up their smaller format stores it will enable them to grow faster in secondary geographies.  Couple this with slightly more aggressive promotions offset by continued share repurchases, more consumers coming into the fold as adoptions increase with the economic recovery, and innovation in the services segment and PetSmart finds itself fairly well positioned to meet expectations.  
  • Ecommerce threat is real but the competitive tension goes both ways. As you are likely to be aware, we ascribed to the theory that ecommerce is skimming customers from major pet specialty retailers. However, it is also clear that they don’t yet view the battle as worth fighting…yet.  While PetSmart has made some tangible moves to better position itself online, it has multiple tricks in its bag that independent ecommerce retailers can’t match.  For every store, PetSmart has a warehouse.  They can offer in store pick-up and returns.  They can bundle products and services.  They can get aggressive with pricing.  Until they rollout their full artillery on this front it’s hard to conclude that they can’t win back that which has been lost to date.

Net net, PetSmart is facing a number of headwinds impacting growth.  Some of their challenges are industry realities and some are self created.  However, we think the timing of these observations is being discounted.  PetSmart has major resets underway to combat these very concerns and multiple levers to pull if, as, and when needed.  The glory days may be gone but we have learned the hard way to bet heavily against the concept.  

/bryan

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